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Introduction
Recent empirical evidence shows that in ‡ation and output growth di¤erentials among Euro Area countries are rather sizeable and very persistent over time 1 . This evidence has attracted substantial public attention, because it suggests that the adjustment mechanism in the single currency area may not be working e¢ ciently. Labor market rigidities are often blamed as one of the potential causes behind the asymmetric adjustment of member countries to economic shocks. The received wisdom is that there is a "need for more ‡exible labor markets in the context of the EU, particularly at the national and regional levels"(ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2005, p. 71) without specifying what labor market ‡exibility means. Euro Area countries are characterized by heavily regulated labor markets, generous unemployment bene…t systems and high unemployment. Looking only at the European aggregate, however, can be misleading. As documented by Blanchard (2006) , Nickell (1997) and Nickell et al. (2001) , labor market institutions vary considerably across EMU member countries. For example, employment protection legislation is extremely tight in countries like Italy, Portugal, France and Spain, but very loose in Ireland. These authors also document large heterogeneity in the degree of wage rigidity, the degree of unionization and in the generosity of the unemployment bene…t systems.
The aim of the present paper is to analyze how asymmetric labor market institutions a¤ect the volatility of in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials in a currency union. For this purpose, we set up a dynamic currency union model that combines three key ingredients: (i) monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities in the goods market, which serve to give a role to monetary policy; (ii) hiring frictions in the labor market, which generate involuntary unemployment; (iii) real wage rigidities, which hinder wage adjustments and shift the labor market adjustment from prices to quantities. We build on Blanchard and Galí (2010) and integrate labor market frictions into our currency union model by assuming the presence of hiring costs, which increase in the degree of labor market tightness. Real wage rigidities are introduced, following much of the literature, by employing a version of Hall's (2005) notion of the wage norm.
To carry out our analysis, we focus on two types of labor market rigidities, Unemployment Rigidities (UR) and Real Wage Rigidities (RWR). The former capture institutions such as employment protection legislation, hiring costs and the matching technology that limit the ‡ows in and out of unemployment, whereas the latter capture the institutions that in ‡uence the responsiveness of real wages to economic activity. 2 We highlight three results: First, we 1 See, e.g., ECB (2003, 2005) , Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) , Benalal et al. (2006) for some evidence on in ‡ation and output di¤erentials and for analyses of the potential causes and policy implications. 2 See Abbritti and Weber (2010) for some evidence on the importance of unemployment rigidities and real 1 show that it is important to distinguish between these two types of rigidities as they have opposite e¤ects on the volatilities of in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials. Unemployment rigidities make it more costly for …rms to hire new workers and shift the adjustment from quantities to prices. A higher degree of UR thus increases the volatility of in ‡ation di¤erentials but reduces the volatility of unemployment di¤erentials. Real wage rigidities, which shift the adjustment from labor prices to labor quantities, substantially increase the volatility of unemployment di¤erentials but have little impact on the volatility of in ‡ation di¤erentials. Second, we …nd that the volatility of both in ‡ation and unemployment di¤er-entials increase in the degree of asymmetry of labor market rigidities across countries. The reason is that di¤erences in labor market institutions lead to strong asymmetric responses to common shocks. Finally, we analyze interaction e¤ects between labor market institutions and …nd that the e¤ects of the two rigidities on in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials tend to o¤set each other if they are positively correlated at the country level, but reinforce each other if they are negatively correlated. Overall, our results suggest that asymmetries in labor market structures worsen the adjustment mechanism of a currency union to symmetric and asymmetric shocks. A few currency union models have been proposed in recent years (see, among others, Benigno, 2004, Galí and Monacelli, 2008 , and Benigno and Lopez-Salido, 2006). The literature has focused on the implications of di¤erent degrees of nominal rigidities in member countries. The main result is that, when asymmetries in the degree of price stickiness are present, an in ‡ation targeting strategy that gives higher weight to in ‡ation in the "sticky price" region is nearly optimal (Benigno, 2004) . Most of these works assume perfectly competitive labor markets and thus ignore a fundamental source of asymmetry among member countries, namely the wide heterogeneity in European labor market institutions. Campolmi and Faia (2011) are the …rst to integrate labor markets frictions "à la MortensenPissarides" into a currency union model. Their paper, which studies the link between in‡ation volatility and unemployment insurance coverage, represents an important …rst step towards an understanding of how the transmission mechanism of monetary policy works in the presence of asymmetries in the structure of labor markets. 3 Our paper di¤ers from their analysis in three important aspects: First, we take a di¤erent perspective on labor markets, as we distinguish between the two types of labor market rigidities mentioned above. Second, we focus our analysis on the volatility of di¤erentials, which directly re ‡ect how shocks are absorbed in the currency union, whereas they analyze di¤erences in the volatility of in ‡ation wage rigidities for business cycle ‡uctuations in OECD countries. 
Assumptions

Preferences
The representative household in country i (i = H or F ) maximizes a standard lifetime utility, which depends on the household's consumption and disutility of work:
where variables with star refer to the foreign country. N i t denotes the number of employed individuals in the representative household of country i while i t denotes shocks to the household's discount factor (preference shocks) 6 . C t and C t are the composite consumption indexes for the home and foreign country respectively, de…ned as:
where C H t is the quantity of the good produced at Home and consumed by home residents, while C H; t denotes the quantity of the good produced at Home and consumed by foreign residents. These consumption bundles are given by the usual CES aggregator with elasticity of substitution between varieties .
2 [0; 1] is the weight on the imported goods in the utility of private consumption.
Utility maximization for the home household is subject to a sequence of budget constraints which, conditional on optimal allocation of expenditures across varieties, is given by 7 :
is the home CPI index, V H t is the nominal payo¤ in period t of the portfolio held at the end of period t 1 and Q t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead nominal payo¤s, which is common across countries. W H t is the nominal wage and H t denotes the pro…ts received by the home households, net of lump-sum taxes. P H t and P F t are the Dixit-Stiglitz domestic price indexes of the home and foreign countries. 6 We model the preference shock as in Smets and Wouters (2003) . 7 Implicit in the budget constraint is the assumption that the law of one price holds across the union. 4 
The Terms of Trade and the Real Exchange Rate
We de…ne the bilateral terms of trade between the home and foreign country as the ratio of the price of goods produced in country F over the price of goods produced in country H:
As the law of one price holds for all goods, which implies P , the CPI and the domestic price indexes in the two regions are related according to:
The real exchange rate RER t is de…ned as the ratio between foreign and home CPIs and is related to the terms of trade according to:
Technology
In each country there are two sectors of production: a retail sector and a wholesale sector. The retail sector is composed by a continuum of monopolistic retailers indexed by z 2 [0; 1], each producing one di¤erentiated consumption good. All retailers share the same technology, which transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods:
where X 
where the variables A i t represent the state of technology in country i. In each period a fraction i of the employed lose their job and join the unemployment pool. Employment in …rm j evolves according to:
where h i t (j) is the number of new hires for …rm j in country i.
Labor Market Flows and Hiring Costs
We assume all unemployed in the family look for a job. Aggregate hiring in country i,
, evolves according to:
where
The number of searching workers who are available for hire, U i t , is de…ned as
and we de…ne unemployment in our model as the fraction of the population who are left without a job after hiring takes place,
Labor market frictions are introduced by assuming that hiring labor is costly. Following Blanchard and Galí (2010), we de…ne the labor market tightness index as the ratio of aggregate hires to the number of searching individuals,
, and we assume that unit recruitment costs are an increasing function of the labor market tightness index:
where ' > 0 and B i is a positive constant. Note that from the viewpoint of the unemployed x i t can be interpreted as the probability of …nding a new job.
Equilibrium under Flexible Prices 2.2.1 Price Setting
The intermediate good produced at Home is sold to home retailers at relative price H t = P I;t P H t , with P I;t being the nominal price of the intermediate good. The problem of the wholesale …rm is to maximize pro…ts by choosing optimally the number of workers it would like to hire in each period. Pro…t maximization gives the …rst order condition:
where w
is the real wage expressed in terms of the consumption good and where
. Equation (4) states that the real marginal revenue product of labor (the left-hand side) has to equal its real marginal cost, that now includes not only real wages but also a component associated with hiring costs. This new component is composed of two terms. The …rst, G H t , represents the additional cost the …rm faces to hire a new worker; the second -the last term in (4) -re ‡ects the savings in future hiring costs resulting from increasing the number of employees today.
Under ‡exible prices, the optimal price setting rule of …nal goods …rms takes the form of a mark-up over the real marginal costs:
and thus in a symmetric equilibrium, where
, the optimal price setting implies
1 for all t. It follows that under ‡exible prices:
where H is the inverse of the mark-up. A similar condition hold for the foreign country.
Wage Determination
We introduce real wage rigidity by employing a version of Hall's (2005) notion of wage norm. A wage norm may arise as a result of social conventions that constrain wage adjustment. One way to model this is to assume that the real wage w H;R t is a weighted average of the Nash bargained wage w H;N ash t and a wage norm w H , which is assumed to be the wage prevailing in steady state. Speci…cally:
where and are indexes of the real wage rigidities present in the home and foreign economy, with 2 [0; 1] and 2 [0; 1]. One can show that the Nash bargained wage is determined as:
where is the relative weight of workers in the Nash bargaining and mrs t = C t N H t (S t ) denotes the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure 8 . The Nash wage rule (7) together with equations (6) and (5) determines the evolution of unemployment under ‡exible prices. Similar conditions hold for the foreign country.
International Risk Sharing and Market Clearing
Households have access to a complete set of contingent claims, traded internationally. Combining the …rst order conditions for state contingent securities in the two countries, we get:
where is a constant, re ‡ecting initial conditions regarding relative net asset positions. To keep things simple, we assume = 1. Throughout our analysis we assume home bias in consumption, i.e.
< 1=2, and thus movements in the terms of trade are re ‡ected in di¤erent consumption rates.
The clearing of all markets implies, for the home and foreign country respectively,
dz are measures of price distortions and $ t and $ t capture the expenditure switching e¤ect of terms of trade ‡uctuations. 9 
The E¢ cient Equilibrium
In a currency union with asymmetric shocks, not all ‡uctuations in economic activity are ine¢ cient. In order to determine the ine¢ cient portion of unemployment and output ‡uc-tuations, this section brie ‡y characterizes the conditions under which the decentralized allo- 8 We follow Blanchard and Galí (2010) and abstract from unemployment bene…ts. Introducing unemployment bene…ts in our model, the wage rule would become:
o where b t is the unemployment bene…t (expressed in domestic prices). Campolmi and Faia (2011) extensively study the e¤ect of di¤erences in b t on in ‡ation di¤erentials inside a currency union. They …nd that countries with higher replacement rates tend to have a lower volatility of in ‡ation and marginal costs. Unemployment bene…ts mainly limit wage variations and thus have the opposite e¤ect of UR in our model. 9 Speci…cally,
, where
cation is e¢ cient. The constrained e¢ cient allocation is found by assuming that the social planner maximizes the welfare of the union, taking as given the technological constraints and the hiring frictions that are present in the decentralized economy (see the Appendix for details). Comparing the solution of the social planner's problem with the decentralized equilibrium under ‡exible prices leads to the following result.
Proposition 1 Under ‡exible prices, the decentralized equilibrium corresponds to the constrained e¢ cient equilibrium if three conditions are satis…ed: 1. Monopolistic distortions in the …nal goods market are eliminated through a production subsidy; 2. The Hosios condition holds, i.e. ' = ; 3. Real wages are fully ‡exible, i.e. i = 0 for i = H; F .
Proof. See the Appendix. Proposition 1 highlights the distortions that characterize the real side of the economy: monopolistic distortions in the goods market, search externalities in the labor market, and real wage rigidities. In the following we assume, as it is common practice 10 , that the …rst two conditions are met, so that the steady state of the decentralized allocation corresponds to the e¢ cient one, and focus on real wage rigidities as the main source of deviation of the ‡exible price allocation from the e¢ cient allocation.
Equilibrium under Sticky Prices
We introduce nominal price rigidity into retailers'maximization problem using the formalism à la Calvo (1983) , where each period …rms may reset their prices with a probability 1 . Thus we obtain the New Keynesian Phillips curve, which is written in log-linear form as:
where^ H t is domestic (i.e. producer prices') in ‡ation, c mc H t =^ H t represents the log deviation of real marginal costs from its steady state value and p = (1 )(1 )= . Note that while (10) looks like the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, the dynamics of the real marginal costs are now substantially di¤erent, as they are deeply a¤ected by the labor market institutions. In fact, log-linearizing equation (4) we can rewrite marginal costs as:
where variables with hat denote log-deviations from steady state, variables without subscript steady state values, is equal to the inverse of the mark-up of retailers and g is the steady state value of unit hiring costs G H t . Marginal costs depend not only on the evolution of real wages, terms of trade and productivity, as in the standard New Keynesian model; they also depend on current labor market conditions (x H t ) and on the future labor market conditions, as captured by the last term on the right-hand side. 11 
Log-linearized Equilibrium Dynamics
Before characterizing the equilibrium dynamics, let us de…neX t as the deviation of a variable X t around its steady state value. Let us also de…ne X t as the (stochastic) e¢ cient equilibrium level ofX t andX t X t X t as the e¢ ciency gap, i.e. the gap between the actual levelX t and its e¢ cient counterpart. Finally, we de…ne union-wide variables asX
. Our currency union model is quite rich, but still tractable, as it can be characterized in few equations. The demand side of the model is standard. The evolution of the aggregate consumption gap at the union level is captured by the union-wide IS equation:
where^ U t is union-wide in ‡ation, r t = E t c U t+1
is the natural real interest rate and{ t the common nominal interest rate. Note that the preference shock leads to higher current consumption relative to future consumption, as it makes individuals discount the future more heavily. While the real interest rate a¤ects aggregate consumption, terms of trade movements distribute consumption among the two countries:
Using the approximationñ
, the market clearing conditions can be expressed as: 
and where the parameters i s are zero for = 1 and positive but small for > 1.
12 Note that movements in the terms of trade lead to changes in consumption at Home and Foreign, and this e¤ect is larger the smaller the degree of home bias in consumption (i.e. the larger is ).
The aggregate supply equations for Home and Foreign are:
where the coe¢ cients h are functions of the structural parameters characterizing the two economies 13 , and the termT i t introduces an endogenous trade-o¤ of monetary policy between in ‡ation stabilization and unemployment gap stabilization. This trade-o¤ is generated by the presence of real wage rigidities which make the response of real wages dynamically ine¢ cient (see, e.g., Blanchard and Galí, 2010) and follows:
A similar condition holds for the foreign country. With completely ‡exible real wages (i.e.
= 0), wages and marginal costs move in proportion to a distributed lag of employment and terms of trade gaps, and productivity shocks do not enter as a separate term in the Phillips curve. On the contrary, in the presence of real wage rigidities (i.e. > 0), productivity shocks enter as a negative cost push shock because wages do not move enough to absorb the impact of the shock, and this translates into ine¢ cient allocations in the product and labor markets. Preference shocks also enter as a cost push shock, mainly because they a¤ect how …rms and workers discount the future value of an employment relationship, but these e¤ects can be shown to be quantitatively small.
Note also that the Phillips Curves depend positively on the current and future evolution of the terms of trade, because the terms of trade not only distribute production among member states, but also a¤ect the wage schedule and the …rms'marginal costs (see equations 7 and 11).
From the de…nition of the terms of trade S t = P F t P H t we get:
Finally, we assume that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate by reacting to 12 Speci…cally, s = 
where ! R captures the degree of interest rate smoothing and " m t is a monetary policy shock. Equations (12)- (19) , together with the evolution of the variables under the e¢ cient allocation, characterize our equilibrium dynamics.
Calibration
In our baseline calibration, we assume that Home and Foreign are perfectly symmetric. The parameters are consistent with those standard in the New Keynesian literature.
Parameter
Value Preferences
Discount rate
0:992
Annual real interest rate of 3.3% Elasticity of int. substitution 
Monetary policy
Response to in ‡ation ! 1:5 Preferences: Time is taken as quarters. The discount factor is set to 0:992, which implies a riskless annual return of about 3:3 percent. In the baseline calibration, the utility is log in consumption ( = 1). We assume the labor supply elasticity to be i = 0. This is consistent with our model if the members of the household have homogenous tastes for leisure. The home bias parameter , representing the share of imported goods on total consumption, is set to 0:25. Technology: Following Blanchard and Galí (2010) we set the parameter ' i in the hiring cost function, representing the sensitivity of hiring costs to labor market conditions, to be
The steady state level of productivity A i is normalized to 1.
The degree of price rigidity i is set equal to 0:66, consistent with data on price duration.
Following Campolmi and Faia (2011) and Blanchard and Galí (2010), we set the degree of real wage rigidity i equal to 0:5.
Shocks:
The standard deviation of the productivity shock, and the persistence and standard deviation of preference shocks are respectively persistence of the productivity shock is set to the standard value of a = 0:95, which is also consistent with the estimates of Sahuc and Smets (2008) . Following Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) we set the correlation between the productivity shocks a to 0:258. Since we do not have data on the correlation of preference shocks across countries, in the baseline calibration we use the same value as for productivity shocks:
For the monetary policy we use a simple rule reacting to in ‡ation with an elasticity ! of 1:5, to the output gap with an elasticity ! y of 0: 5 4 and a persistence in interest rates ! R = 0:85.
14 The standard deviation of monetary policy shocks is set to 0:001, consistent with the estimates by Thomas and Zanetti (2009) . The labor market: In the baseline calibration, we set unemployment in country i to be u i = 0:08, which matches roughly the average unemployment rate in Europe. The job-…nding rate x i is set to 0:45, which corresponds to a monthly rate of 0:18. Given u i and x i , it is possible to determine the separation rate using the relation
We obtain a value i = 0:071. The relative bargaining power i is set to 1, which implies that …rms and workers have the same bargaining power. The scaling parameter B i is chosen such that hiring costs represent a 1 percent fraction of steady state output, as in Walsh (2005) . The parameters i can then be determined using steady state identities.
In our analysis in the next section, we distinguish between two types of labor market imperfections: Unemployment Rigidities (UR), which capture the institutions -such as em-ployment protection legislation, hiring costs and the matching technology -that limit the ‡ows in and out of unemployment; and Real Wage Rigidities (RWR), intended to capture all the institutions -including wage norms, wage indexation and the wage bargaining mechanism and legislation -which in ‡uence the responsiveness of real wages to economic activity.
To study the role of di¤erent degrees of RWR, we simulate the model varying i from 0:25 to 0:75. Calibrating the degree of UR is a more challenging task, as the overall degree of "rigidity" in the labor market does not depend only on one parameter but on the entire con…guration of the labor market. Following Blanchard and Galí (2010), we de…ne a labor market as " ‡exible" when the job-…nding and the separation rate are high; the opposite holds in a "sclerotic"labor market. The following tabulation shows the parameters implied by our calibration strategy: As our UR index increases from 0 to 1, the job-…nding rate decreases from 0:7 to 0:2, the separation rate decreases from 0:12 to 0:03 and the unemployment rate increases from 0:05 to 0:11. Note that we keep constant total hiring costs in steady state as percentage of GDP. This implies that marginal hiring costs are higher in labor markets with low hiring rates (i.e. high UR). This is consistent with a view of "sclerotic" economies characterized by institutional constraints on the hiring process. 15 Note also that our baseline calibration wage rigidities have the opposite e¤ect on h 0 : higher degrees of RWR lower the sensitivity of real wages and in ‡ation to unemployment changes. Note also that the sensitivity of the slope to RWR is much smaller than to UR, and becomes sizeable only when UR are high. This suggests that there may be important interaction e¤ects between di¤erent types of labor market rigidities.
While UR have a dominant role in explaining the size of the slope coe¢ cient h 0 , RWR are the main determinant of the trade-o¤ coe¢ cient h T 18 . In particular, note that when 6 = 0, preference and productivity shocks alter the endogenous wedgeT H t and thus enter as cost push shocks in the Phillips curve.
Labor Market Rigidities and In ‡ation and Unemployment Differentials
To assess how the dynamics of the currency union depend on the underlying labor market structure, we simulate the economy for di¤erent degrees of UR and RWR. Speci…cally, in this …rst exercise we change either the degree of UR or the degree of RWR for both countries at the same time. This allows us to understand how the average degree of labor market rigidity in the monetary union a¤ects in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials. We de…ne the in ‡ation di¤erential as^ Note that the unemployment di¤erential is expressed in terms of the deviation from the e¢ cient allocation, and thus any deviation from zero re ‡ects ine¢ ciencies in the adjustment process of the currency union. Figure 2 shows the results of this exercise. A higher degree of UR increases the volatil- Unemployment rigidities make it more costly for …rms to hire new workers and induce …rms to absorb shocks through an increase in prices. A higher degree of RWR, on the contrary, strongly increases the volatility of the unemployment di¤erential, because, as in Hall (2005), wage rigidities increase the responsiveness of pro…ts and thus hirings to shocks. The e¤ect of real wage rigidities on the in ‡ation di¤erential is instead small and the slope is sensitive to calibration choices 19 .
Labor market rigidities are often blamed as one of the possible causes of large and longlasting in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials in the European Monetary Union. Our results, however, suggest that it is crucial to distinguish among the institutions that constrain the "quantity"adjustment (UR) from the ones that constrain the "price"adjustment (RWR) in the labor market, as these may have very di¤erent implications.
Result 1 (Labor Market Rigidities and the Volatility of Di¤erentials): UR and RWR have di¤erent e¤ects on the volatility of in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials: UR increase the volatility of the in ‡ation di¤erential but reduce the volatility of the unemployment di¤erential, while RWR increase the volatility of the unemployment di¤erential but have little e¤ect on the volatility of the in ‡ation di¤erential. 
The Importance of Asymmetries in Labor Market Rigidities
We further analyze how labor market asymmetries a¤ect the volatility of di¤erentials, holding the average degree of UR and RWR constant. For this purpose, we construct an index of asymmetry that starts out at 0 where both countries are perfectly symmetric (the baseline calibration). As the index increases towards 1, the two countries become increasingly different but the average degree of UR and RWR does not change. 20 The following tabulation
shows the values of the underlying parameters:
Complete Symmetry: Index=0 Strong Asymmetry: Index=1
Asymmetric UR Figure 3 shows that the volatility of in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials is increasing in asymmetries in both UR and RWR. Asymmetries in the degree of real wage rigidity are found to increase substantially the volatility of the unemployment di¤erential. Asymmetric unemployment rigidities have instead a stronger e¤ect on the volatility of the in ‡ation differential, which is related to the fact that in the presence of high UR …rms adjust to shocks by adjusting prices rather than quantities. Overall, these results suggest that asymmetries in labor market structures worsen the adjustment of a currency union to shocks.
The reason for this result is simple and intuitive: when asymmetries are present, sym- metric shocks are transmitted di¤erently across member countries and, as a consequence, in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials arise. This result is remarkably robust as long as the correlation of shocks across countries is high enough. When the correlation of productivity and preference shocks is lower than in the baseline calibration, the volatility of di¤erentials is still increasing, except for the volatility of the unemployment di¤erential, which is slightly decreasing in the degree of asymmetry in UR. Notice, however, that it is likely that these shocks are more strongly correlated across members of the EMU than in our baseline calibration ( a = 0:258) because our baseline calibration is based on an estimate of a between the U.S. and a European aggregate (see Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992) .
Result 2 (Asymmetric Labor Market Rigidities and the Volatility of Di¤er-entials): Unless shocks are very weakly correlated across member countries, asymmetries in UR and RWR increase the volatility of in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials in a currency union. This suggests that asymmetries in labor markets worsen the adjustment of a currency union to shocks. Note: all series are unfiltered and inflation is annualized.
Interactions Between Labor Market Rigidities
Table 2. The volatilities of the differentials and the interaction between asymmetries
How important are interaction e¤ects between di¤erent types of labor market rigidities? Panel A of Table 2 shows the volatility of in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials for a currency union characterized by asymmetries in both UR and RWR. The symmetric currency union follows the baseline calibration, whereas "Asymmetric UR" and "Asymmetric RWR" in rows 2 and 3 represent a currency union where the corresponding index of asymmetry is set to 1. The results con…rm the Result 2 in the previous section. The rows 4 and 5 of Panel A study the interactions between asymmetries in UR and asymmetries in RWR, where "complements" characterizes a currency union where the home country has both low UR and low RWR (and, similarly, the foreign country has both high UR and high RWR). "Substitutes", on the other hand, characterizes a currency union where the home country has low UR and high RWR and the foreign country high UR and low RWR. The results show that when rigidities are complements at the country level, the volatility of in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials is somewhere in between the numbers of the currency union characterized by asymmetries in unemployment rigidities and the currency union characterized by asymmetries in real wage rigidity. In contrast, the adjustment mechanism of the currency union is much worse when labor market rigidities are substitutes at the country level, as the volatility of the in ‡ation and the unemployment di¤erential (as well as the volatility of the union variables) is higher than for any other economy. This suggests that when rigidities are substitutes, their e¤ects tend to reinforce each other, whereas when they are complements the e¤ects of asymmetries tend to o¤set each other.
Panel B further analyzes the results of simulations where we assume that all shocks are perfectly correlated across countries. As expected, the in ‡ation and unemployment di¤eren-tial are zero at all times when the home and the foreign country are identical (the symmetric case). When the countries have asymmetric labor market structures, however, the volatility of these di¤erentials increase dramatically. Moreover, when asymmetries are substitutes, the volatility of unemployment di¤erentials is highest when shocks are perfectly correlated (i.e., compared to the corresponding numbers in Panel A). This is somewhat surprising as asymmetric shocks are completely absent here as a source of volatile di¤erentials. Thus, if labor market institutions are asymmetric across countries, the costs of a currency union might be substantial even in the presence of highly correlated shocks across countries.
Result 3 (Interactions between Labor Market Rigidities):
There are important interaction e¤ects between asymmetries in UR and asymmetries in RWR: when these rigidities are substitutes, their e¤ects reinforce each other, whereas when they are complements their e¤ects tend to o¤set each other.
Conclusion
This paper investigates how asymmetric labor market institutions a¤ect the adjustment of a currency union to shocks. In our analysis, we focus on two types of labor market rigidities, Unemployment Rigidities (UR) and Real Wage Rigidities (RWR). The former capture institutions such as employment protection legislation, hiring costs and the matching technology that limit the ‡ows in and out of unemployment, whereas the latter capture institutions that in ‡uence the responsiveness of real wages to economic activity. Three main conclusions emerge from our analysis:
First, the two types of labor market rigidities have very di¤erent e¤ects on the incentives for …rms to reset prices and thus on the Phillips curve. A higher degree of unemployment rigidities makes the Phillips curve steeper whereas real wage rigidities make the Phillips curve ‡atter. The basic intuition is that in ‡ation is more sensitive to labor market conditions when …rms adjust prices rather than quantities in response to shocks. Second, labor market rigidities have a strong impact on the adjustment mechanism of the currency union to shocks. We …nd that unemployment rigidities increase the volatility of the in ‡ation di¤erential but reduce the volatility of the unemployment di¤erential, while real wage rigidities increase the volatility of the unemployment di¤erential and have little e¤ect on the volatility of the in ‡ation di¤erential. Asymmetries in unemployment and real wage rigidities across countries, however, increase the volatility of both in ‡ation and unemployment di¤erentials, mainly because di¤erent labor market institutions lead to strong asymmetric responses to common shocks.
Finally, we study interaction e¤ects between these two rigidities. We de…ne rigidities as "complements" when unemployment and real wage rigidities are positively correlated at the country level, and as "substitutes" when they are negatively correlated at the country level. We …nd that the e¤ects of the rigidities tend to o¤set each other when they occur in complements, but they reinforce each other when they are substitutes. This is an interesting result and further underlines the importance of distinguishing between di¤erent types of labor market rigidities.
Overall, our results suggest that asymmetries in labor market structures worsen the adjustment mechanism of a currency union to symmetric and asymmetric shocks. Therefore, it may be optimal to coordinate labor market reforms across the member countries of a currency union and to limit the degree of asymmetry in labor market rigidities. Another important consideration is that, in the presence of asymmetric labor market structures, monetary policy shocks themselves create terms of trade movements and are a source of di¤erentials. The question then is whether the central bank can exploit these asymmetries and gain from responding systematically to di¤erentials. Our model abstracts from a number of issues, such as imperfect insurance markets for unemployment risk, that make welfare comparisons and thus the derivation of the optimal policy di¢ cult. Nevertheless, we think that these are important issues and we leave it to future research to tackle these questions. Note: all series are unfiltered and inflation is annualized. Marginal cost shocks can be introduced easily by modelling them as shocks to the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The standard deviation for marginal cost shocks is assumed to be 0.3, which is well above the 0.164 in Smets and Wouters (2003) . We assume an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.85 for these shocks.
